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 Abstract 
We document the existence of a gubernatorial election cycle in state executions, 
suggesting that election year political considerations play a role in determining the timing of 
executions. Our analysis indicates that states are approximately 25 percent more likely to 
conduct executions in gubernatorial election years than in other years. We also find that elections 
have a larger effect on the probability that an African American defendant will be executed in a 
given year than on the probability that a white defendant will be executed, and that the overall 
effect of elections is largest in the South. These findings raise concerns that state executions may 
fail to meet the constitutional requirements stipulated by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia 
for the administration of state death penalty laws. 
 1. Introduction 
The rapid increase over the past decade in both the number of executions conducted 
nationally and the number of states that utilize capital punishment has renewed interest in the 
policy ramifications of death penalty laws and their application. Figure 1 shows the trend in the 
number of executions by year from 1977 to 2000. In the period from 1976, when the death 
penalty was again ruled constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976), until the early 1990s there was a gradual increase in the number of 
executions performed by state governments. However, beginning in the early 1990s, the pace at 
which states have been executing defendants has accelerated rapidly, from approximately 20 
executions per year in the early 1990s to a high of roughly 100 in 1999. 
 There have also been significant increases over this period in the number of states that 
have reinstated the death penalty and the percentage of death penalty states that have conducted 
executions. Figure 2 shows the trend in the number of states that have a death penalty over the 
sample period. At the beginning of the sample, only 28 states had a death penalty, but over the 
last twenty years, ten more states have added death penalty laws. As the number of states with 
the death penalty has increased, the percentage of these states that execute a defendant in a given 
year has also increased. Figure 3 shows the trends in the percentage of states that use the death 
penalty over time. Over the last four years of the sample, almost one-half of states with a death 
penalty used it in any given year.  
These trends, although informative about what has occurred nationally, mask sizeable 
differences in the frequency with which states conduct executions. Table 1 presents the average 
number of executions performed in each death penalty state for the years that the death penalty 
was in effect. The majority of death penalty states average less than one execution per year, 
indicating that executions are rare events in most states. However, there are several states that 
conduct executions with considerable regularity, including Texas (with approximately ten 
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executions per year), Virginia (three executions per year), Florida (two executions per year), and 
Missouri (two executions per year). 
In the absence of any consensus on the deterrent effects of capital punishment (see 
Ehrlich 1975, 1977; Grogger 1990; and Ehrlich and Liu 1999), the focus of recent policy debates 
has shifted to the possible arbitrary application of the death penalty and the associated 
implications for defendants’ due process rights.1 This focus is consistent with the conditions set 
forth by the United State Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, where the Court ruled that states 
could again impose the death penalty provided that its application was neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory. In evaluating whether current state practices meet these criteria, policymakers 
have for the most part focused on racial and other disparities observed at the sentencing stage of 
the process, with considerably less attention being paid to possible irregularities existing at the 
time of execution. 
In this paper, we conduct an analysis of the impact of gubernatorial elections on state 
executions.2 We find that the presence of a gubernatorial election increases the probability of a 
state execution by approximately 25 percent. We also find that elections have a larger effect on 
the probability that an African American defendant will be executed in a given year than on the 
probability that a white defendant will be executed, and that the overall effect of elections is 
largest in the South. Interestingly, the effect of elections is attenuated by the presence of 
gubernatorial term limits, which presumably weaken the incentives to manipulate the timing of 
executions for political gain. Although not definitive, we also present some evidence that the 
cyclical effects we identify lead to reductions in the amount of time that executed defendants 
spend on death row.3 
These results suggest that concerns about legal due process should not be restricted to the 
sentencing phase, but should also extend to the manner in which defendants are selected for 
execution. The issue of how gubernatorial discretion is exercised in capital cases has taken on 
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increased importance over time as the availability of post-conviction judicial review has been 
increasingly limited at both the state and federal levels (Langbein 1999; Pridemore 2000). More 
generally, our findings raise questions about the extent to which states are in compliance with the 
constitutional requirements for executions set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg 
v. Georgia. 
Other recent work has also been concerned about the possibility that political and other 
extra-legal factors may be playing a role in both the sentencing and punishment phases of capital 
cases. Culver (1999) documents the widespread politicization of the death penalty at the state 
level and the sometimes intense political pressure that is brought to bear on elected officials who 
oppose capital punishment. A well-known example is the removal of Rose Bird and two of her 
colleagues from the California Supreme Court, the first time in the state’s history that appellate 
judges were removed from office. In a similar case, Penny White, a Tennessee Supreme Court 
justice, was the first appellate judge in Tennessee to lose a retention election, primarily due to 
her support for a controversial decision that overturned a death sentence in a high-profile murder 
case.  
Culver also discusses the apparent political pressures that capital cases create for 
governors. Examples include New Mexico’s Toney Anaya (D: 1983-1986), who in his last 
months in office commuted the death sentences of all five men on New Mexico’s death row, and 
Ohio governor Richard Celeste (D: 1983 to 1991), who commuted the death sentences of seven 
death row prisoners just four days before leaving office. The timing of executive decisions in 
these examples suggests that political considerations have played a role in the disposition of 
capital cases.  
Another study, by Langbein (1999), examines whether the same racial and political 
factors that appear to play a role in determining which defendants receive the death penalty carry 
over to the decision to perform an execution. Using data on a panel of death penalty states from 
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1977 to 1992, she finds that the number of executions performed in a state are significantly 
related to measures of black political power and the adoption by states of restrictions on the post-
conviction legal options of defendants. She also finds some evidence that the race and gender of 
victims plays a role, as does the severity of the crime.  
Finally, a recent study by Pridemore (2000) examines the determinants of governors’ 
commutation decisions. Using data on 4800 persons sentenced to death in the United States 
between 1974 and 1995, he finds that the number of commutations per execution in a state 
declines in gubernatorial election years compared to other years. Although Pridemore’s finding 
of a gubernatorial election cycle in commutation decisions relative to executions is suggestive of 
the type of political influence that we seek to quantify, our analysis differs from his in several 
important ways. First, although his study is based on a relatively long panel of data, he does not 
control for either national trends in executions or state-specific differences in the propensity to 
execute. Second, given that Pridemore only examines how the number of commutations relative 
to the number of executions varies over the electoral cycle, his work cannot determine whether 
this cycle is being driven by changes in commutation behavior, changes in execution behavior, or 
both.4 Our work disentangles these effects. Finally, we examine other (related) outcomes that 
may be influenced by elections, such as differential effects of elections by race, region, and party 
affiliation of the governor, the impact of term limits, and the effect of elections on the amount of 
time that prisoners spend on death row.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. In Section 3, we 
discuss our empirical methodology and present our main findings. Section 4 presents some 
additional evidence supporting the existence of an election cycle in state executions. Section 5 
explores, to the extent possible, how the election effect we document affects the amount of time 
defendants spend on death row before they are executed. Concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 6. 
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2. Data 
The execution data come from two sources. The first is a panel of the United States, with 
yearly observations running from 1977 to 2000. Information on the annual number of executions 
in a state is taken from publications of the Death Penalty Information Center, and tabulations on 
the race of defendants executed by states are obtained from the publication “Death Row, U.S.A.” 
(NAACP Legal Defense Fund 2001). 
 States are excluded from the sample if they had no death penalty at any time between 
1977 and 2000. States that instituted a death penalty during the sample period are included in the 
data set beginning the year after the death penalty was reinstated.5 Table 1 lists the states that 
reinstated the death penalty, the year of the reinstatement and the average number of people who 
have been executed per year by each state in the years after the death penalty was reinstated. 
 Summary statistics of this panel of states are presented in Table 2. In about one quarter of 
the state/year cells in the sample, there is at least one execution; on average, there are about 0.8 
executions per year in a state with the death penalty. About 55 percent of these executions are of 
white defendants, and about 36 percent are African-Americans. 
 We also have information on all persons sentenced to death since 1972 from the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics publication, Capital Punishment in the United States: 1973-1999. This data 
set contains information on the demographic characteristics of death row inmates, their criminal 
backgrounds, and the amount of time that each spent on death row. For each year that a state has 
at least one execution between 1977 and 1999, we calculate the average time on death row for 
the defendants executed that year.6 On average, the wait on death row is slightly less than 10 
years. 
 Data on the timing of gubernatorial elections is taken from The Book of the States 
(Council of State Governments 2001). Election cycles vary across states for several reasons. 
First, some states have gubernatorial elections every two years while most states have elections 
 6
every four years. Also, most states schedule their elections on even calendar years, but there is a 
significant minority of states that hold elections in odd years. Finally, among states with a four-
year election cycle during even years, some hold elections in presidential election years while 
others have elections at the midpoint of presidential terms. There is a similar staggering for states 
with four-year cycles that hold elections in odd years. 
3. Election Cycles in State Executions 
To measure the effect of gubernatorial elections on executions, we begin by estimating a 
probit model of the form: 
( ) ( )t,iitt,it,i IndicatorElectionExecutionrP ηγϕβα ++++Φ=            (1) 
where i indexes states and t indexes time. t,iExecution  is an indicator that state i had at least one 
execution in year t; t,iIndicatorElection  is an indicator that state i had a gubernatorial election in 
year t. tϕ  is a full set of year effects; iγ  is a full set of state effects, and t,iη  is a set of state 
linear time trends.  
 The coefficient of interest is β , which measures how having a gubernatorial election in a 
state affects the probability that the state has an execution that year. The year dummies control 
for national trends in executions that may be correlated with gubernatorial elections. The state 
fixed effects control for any fixed state-specific omitted variables that may be correlated with the 
propensity of states to hold executions, and the state trends control for linear changes over time 
in the propensity of a state to perform executions that might be correlated with elections. 
Therefore, β  is identified by differences in execution behavior in states with and without a 
gubernatorial election in a given year that are different than their linear trends. 
We concentrate on the probability that a state has at least one execution in a given year, 
rather than on the number of executions performed, for a couple of reasons. First, as discussed in 
the Introduction, executions are rare in most states; the majority of death penalty states have 
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either no executions or one execution per year during the sample period. Table 3 presents a 
tabulation of the frequency of executions for the 842 state/year observations in our sample. In a 
large majority of state/year cells, there are no executions. For years in which states do hold 
executions, more than half of the time they have only one execution. Thus, for most states, the 
primary source of variation in their propensity to execute is based on whether they have any 
executions in a given year. 
Second, if there is an effect of elections on execution propensities, we would expect it to 
be concentrated on the margin where the political benefit of holding an additional execution is 
likely to be the largest. Because, from a political perspective, there are probably diminishing 
returns to conducting executions, it seems likely that the marginal benefit of performing an 
execution would be largest in states where executions are uncommon. In states that rarely 
execute, an additional execution often attracts substantial press coverage; whereas in states 
where executions are commonplace, an extra execution typically generates little coverage. As a 
result, if there is an election cycle in state executions, we would expect it to be most pronounced 
along the zero-one margin. Later, we will also estimate a count model that restricts the marginal 
effect of an election to be constant and independent of the number of executions conducted. 
 The estimates from the probit model are presented in Table 4, using our sample of 
executions from 1977 to 2000. Column (1) displays the results of the estimation of Equation (1). 
The coefficient on the election indicator is positive and statistically different from zero. The 
estimated marginal probability suggests that a gubernatorial election increases the probability of 
a state execution by slightly less than 6 percentage points. Evaluated at the mean execution 
probability observed in our sample, this estimate indicates that states are about 25 percent more 
likely to perform an execution in an election year than in other years. 
 We are concerned that the state linear trends might not be adequately controlling for 
time-varying omitted variables that are correlated with elections and the probability that a state 
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holds an execution. Therefore, we investigate the robustness of our results to two alternative 
specifications. In Column (2), we add division× year interactions to the model presented in 
Equation (1). The divisions are the nine Census divisions of the United States.7 Adding these 
interactions controls for any division-level time-varying omitted variables that are correlated 
with the likelihood that a state performs an execution. The coefficient on the election indicator is 
again positive and statistically different from zero. The marginal effect of an election is slightly 
bigger than the estimate in Column (1), but an election still increases the probability of an 
execution by about 25 percent.8 
 We add governor fixed effects to the model presented in Equation (1); these are dummy 
variables for each individual who served as governor in a state over the sample period. The 
results are presented in Column (3) of Table 4. The coefficient on gubernatorial elections is 
identified in this specification by examining whether the propensity to perform executions varies 
across election and non-election years within each individual governor’s tenure in office.9 The 
estimate of the effect of an election using this model is again slightly larger than our previous 
estimates and still statistically different from zero. The marginal effect of an election in this 
model implies an increase in the probability of an execution of slightly less than 7 percentage 
points, which represents more than a 25 percent increase over the baseline execution probability. 
 Finally, we add additional control variables to the specification that includes governor 
fixed effects. In Column (4), we include two measures of state economic performance: the state 
unemployment rate and state per capita income. The addition of these variables does not change 
the effect of gubernatorial elections on execution probabilities. In Column (5), we add measures 
of the state death row population at the beginning of each year. The first variable is the number 
of people on death row in the state and the second is the percentage of the death row population 
that is white. These additional controls also have little effect on our parameter estimates. We 
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have also included all of these state-level controls in our subsequent models; again, they do not 
affect our estimates of interest. For brevity, we do not report these results. 
 Given our finding that elections increase the probability of an execution in a state, we 
next examine whether the effect of an election on the likelihood of a state execution varies by the 
race of the defendant. We re-estimate Equation (1) with two separate dependent variables: the 
first is an indicator for whether a state executes at least one white defendant in a given year and 
the second is an indicator for whether a state executes at least one African American defendant in 
a given year. These results are presented in Table 5. Columns (1) through (3) present the results 
for the executions of white defendants using: in Column (1), our basic probit model with state-
specific trends; in Column (2), division× year effects; and in Column (3), governor fixed effects. 
In all specifications, the effect of gubernatorial elections is positive but small and not statistically 
different from zero; a gubernatorial election only increases the probability that a state executes a 
white defendant by between 7 percent (Column (1)) and 13 percent (Column (2)). 
 On the other hand, as shown in Columns (4) through (6), there is a large effect of 
elections on the probability that a state executes an African American in all specifications. The 
effect of a gubernatorial election is positive, large and statistically different from zero in all 
specifications, implying that a gubernatorial election increases the chance there is at least one 
execution of an African American defendant by between 29 percent (Column (6)) and 37 percent 
(Column (5)).10 In the literature on sentencing, it is often noted that attempts to determine the 
pure effect of race on the receipt of the death penalty are confounded by the fact that African 
Americans are more likely to be involved in murders with aggravating circumstances (Langbein 
1999). To investigate this possibility, we estimated the same probit models as were used for 
black defendants, but changed the dependent variable to the probability that the state executes at 
least one defendant who was involved in a multi-victim homicide in a given year. The election 
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coefficients from these models were two to three times smaller than the coefficients from the 
corresponding models for black defendants and were not statistically different from zero. 
There are also differences in the effect of gubernatorial elections on executions by region 
of the country. We divide the United States into the South and the rest of the country and 
estimate a probit model that allows the effect of gubernatorial elections to vary across these 
regions.11 The model specification is: 
( ) ( )t,iitit,i2t,i1t,i IndicatorSouthElectionIndicatorElectionExecutionPr ηγϕββα +++×++Φ=   (2) 
where j indexes regions. iSouth  is an indicator that state i is in the South, and the other variables 
are defined as before.12 2β  is the coefficient of interest, which measures whether the effect of 
gubernatorial elections on execution probabilities is different in the South than the rest of the 
United States.13 The results of this estimation are displayed in Table 6. Column (1) presents the 
basic estimates, Column (2) adds division×year effects to the regression specification, and 
Column (3) adds governor effects. All specifications produce similar patterns in the coefficients 
on the direct election effect and the interaction term, suggesting that the positive effect of 
gubernatorial elections on the probability of executions is concentrated in states in the South. 
Using a similar methodology, we also examine whether there are differences in the effect 
of gubernatorial elections on executions based on the party affiliation of the governor. The model 
specification is: 
( ) ( )t,iitt,it,i3t,i2t,i1t,i GOPElectionGovernorGOPElectionExecutionPr ηγϕβββα +++×+++Φ=  (3) 
where t,iGovernorGOP  is an indicator that the sitting governor in the state is a Republican, and 
the other variables are defined as above. 3β  is the coefficient of interest, which measures 
whether the effect of elections on executions is different in states with a Republican governor 
than in states with other governors. The results are presented in Table 7. For all three sets of 
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controls, we find little difference in the effect of elections for states with Republican governors 
compared to other states.14  
Our final cut of the data is to examine whether the effect of elections on the probability of 
executions differs for states with gubernatorial term limits compared to other states. In a state in 
which an administration can only be reelected a limited number of times, there might be less of 
an incentive to manipulate executions. Our model specification is: 
( ) ( )t,iitt,it,i3t,i2t,i1t,i LimitTermElectionLimitTermElectionExecutionPr ηγϕβββα +++×+++Φ=  (4) 
where t,iLimitTerm is an indicator that state i has a gubernatorial term limit in year t, and the 
other variables are defined as before.15 The coefficient on the interaction term measures whether 
elections have a different effect in states with term limits than other states. Table 8 displays the 
estimates of Equation (4). In all three specifications, the effect of elections in states with term 
limits is smaller than in other states. In the specifications with state time trends (Column (1)) and 
governor fixed effects (Column (3)), the difference is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 16 
4. Additional Evidence 
Instead of estimating how gubernatorial elections affect the likelihood that a state holds 
an execution, we can also measure how elections affect the number of executions held in a state 
in a given year. To do this, we estimate a count model in which the independent variables are the 
same as in our probit models, but the dependent variable is the number of executions that a state 
holds in a year. 
 Results for three negative binomial regressions are presented in Table 9. The coefficient 
on the indicator for a gubernatorial election in Column (1) is positive but imprecisely estimated. 
The implied marginal effect of a gubernatorial election is about 0.17 additional executions in a 
state, an increase of about 20 percent. In Column (2), division×year effects are again added to 
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the model specification. The effect of elections is again positive and now statistically different 
from zero at the 10 percent significance level. The calculated marginal effect implies that an 
election increases the number of executions in a state by about 30 percent. Finally, in Column (3) 
we add the governor effects. The coefficient on gubernatorial elections is similar to the previous 
specification and is statistically different from zero.17 
 One drawback of using a count model is that it constrains the estimated marginal effect of 
an election on the likelihood a state has an extra execution to be constant, no matter how many 
executions a state has in a given year. As discussed above, we expect the effect of elections to be 
more important in states that typically have few executions and to be less of a factor in high 
execution states. This may explain why our count model results are weaker than the estimates 
from our probit models. 
As a sensitivity check on our probit models, we estimated a multinomial logit model to 
examine the effect of gubernatorial elections on the transitions of all death row inmates out of 
death row. The sample includes every death row inmate each year he is on death row, using the 
data set from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Four outcomes can occur during the year. The 
inmate could either continue to stay on death row or leave death row because he was executed, 
died for other reasons, or his sentence was overturned.18 Table 10 shows the annual probability 
of these transitions in our data set. In our multinomial logit model, the probability of outcome j 
occurring is given by: 
( )
D
X
p jj
β'exp
    = , j=1,2,…m-1               (5) 
and 
D
p m
1    =  
where 
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'exp    1    
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j
jXD β , 
(j=1,2,…m) are the different outcomes that can occur to a death row inmate in a year, jp  is the 
probability that outcome j occurs, X is a vector of characteristics, and jβ  is the vector of 
coefficients pertaining to outcome j.  
 As with a simple bivariate logit model, the coefficients in a multinomial logit are 
estimated only up to a scale factor, while the coefficients for the reference choice ( mβ , staying 
on death row in this application) are set equal to zero. The explanatory variables included in the 
model are an indicator for whether there is a gubernatorial election in the state the year of the 
observation, various demographic characteristics of the inmate (dummies for race, sex, marital 
status, education and time on death row), and our standard set of state and year effects and state 
linear trends. As with the count models, this model does not allow for different effects of 
elections on the movement of prisoners off death row based on the number of executions that 
have occurred in the state. 
 The results of this estimation are presented in Table 11. We are most interested in two 
transitions out of death row: executions and overturned sentences. Therefore, the coefficients we 
present measure the effect of gubernatorial elections on the probability that a defendant is 
executed instead of remaining on death row and the probability that a defendant has his sentence 
changed instead of remaining on death row.  
Columns (1) through (3) present the estimates of the execution transition. The first 
Column shows the results of our basic model; the effect of a gubernatorial election is positive 
and statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance.19 The implied increase 
in the probability of an execution in an election year is approximately 0.38 percentage points, or 
about a 30 percent increase relative to the baseline probability. In Column (2), we add 
division× year effects to the model specification. Again there is a positive estimated effect of 
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elections on the probability an inmate is executed, and the estimate is statistically different from 
zero. The implied increase in the probability that a defendant is executed in an election year is 
about 50 percent in this specification. Finally, in Column (3), we add governor effects; the 
coefficient on the election indicator is similar to the previous specifications, but the standard 
error is very large and the effect is not statistically different from zero. Columns (4) through (6) 
present the estimates of the sentence change transition. In all specifications, the effect of an 
election year is small and not statistically different from zero.  
In an effort to better understand the source of the election cycle in executions, we 
examine whether changes in commutations can explain the increase in executions during election 
years. Using the Bureau of Justice Statistics data on all death row inmates, we calculate the 
number of commutations performed in each state each year. We then estimate whether states are 
more or less likely to commute death sentences during election years than other years. The probit 
specification we use is identical to Equation (1), except that the dependent variable is an 
indicator for whether the state commutes a death sentence in a given year. Results of this 
estimation are reported in Table 12. Using our usual sets of controls, we find no evidence that 
states are more or less likely to commute death sentences during election years.20 Therefore, it 
does not appear that the election cycle in executions is being driven by changes in commutation 
behavior.21 
5. Issues Related to Timing 
 In this section, we explore the temporal process that leads to additional executions in 
election years relative to non-election years. We study whether the election cycle in state 
executions is generated by, on average, moving executions up in time or holding them back. This 
distinction is of interest because the latter scenario would not appear to compromise the due 
process rights of death row inmates while the former scenario might. As discussed below, the 
data do not permit us to directly test whether the additional executions held in election years 
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represent “extra” executions that would not have occurred otherwise, or whether they instead 
reflect substitutions over time from among a fixed stock of executions. Of course, these two 
possibilities are not mutually exclusive. 
We investigate whether defendants executed during election years stayed on death row 
for shorter periods of time than defendants executed in other years using information on all 
persons on death row between 1973 to 1999. For each year that a state has at least one execution, 
we calculate the average time the people executed in that state were on death row. By “time on 
death row,” we mean the number of months between the date that the defendant was first 
sentenced to death and the date that he was executed. Note that there are only 199 state/year cells 
between 1977 and 1999 with at least one execution; thus, the precision of our estimates is limited 
by the small size of the sample. The regression specification is: 
( ) t,it,iitt,it,i IndicatorElectionRowDeathonTimeAverageln εηγϕβα +++++=          (6) 
where t,iRowDeathonTimeAverage is the average number of months that defendants who were 
executed in state i in year t waited on death row, and the other variables are defined as before. 
 The results of the OLS regressions of Equation (6) are presented in Table 13. The 
coefficient on the election indicator is negative and statistically different from zero in Column 
(1), suggesting that defendants executed during election years spent about 19 percent (exp(-
.1777) – 1) less time on death row than people executed in other years. Given an average stay on 
death row of approximately ten years, this implies that inmates executed during election years 
have their stays shortened by slightly less than two years on average. In Column (2), 
division× year effects are added to the specification; the coefficient becomes smaller in absolute 
value and is not statistically different from zero. By this estimate, a defendant executed during an 
election year has about a 9 percent shorter spell on death row (approximately 11 months) than 
other defendants who are executed. The final Column adds the governor effects. The coefficient 
implies that inmates executed during election years had about a 14 percent shorter stay on death 
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row (approximately 17 months) than other executed defendants, but the standard error is too 
large for this effect to be statistically different from zero. 
 Given that inmates who are executed during election years appear to spend less time on 
death row than other inmates, a natural question to ask is whether the increased executions 
during election years represent “extra” executions, or whether they would have occurred at a 
later date anyway. This is a difficult question because the evidence we have generated does not 
allow us to discriminate among these two possibilities. To definitively distinguish between the 
two scenarios, one would need to know the counterfactual of how states would behave in the 
absence of an election cycle. But because all states have election cycles, and have them all the 
time, it is impossible to know this counterfactual. Sorting out the exact mechanisms through 
which election cycles in executions are implemented does not appear to be possible with our 
data, but remains an important area for future research.22 
6. Conclusion 
Our analysis indicates that holding other factors constant, states are approximately 25 
percent more likely to conduct executions in gubernatorial election years than in other years. 
Moreover, elections have a larger effect on the probability that an African American defendant 
will be executed in a given year than on the probability that a white defendant will be executed. 
We also find evidence that the total number of executions performed is higher in election years, 
that the relationship between elections and executions is strongest in the South, and that 
gubernatorial term limits weaken the impact of elections on executions. Further, we find some 
evidence that the existence of politically-timed executions reduces the average time that executed 
defendants spend on death row, suggesting that the increased executions observed in election 
years may result from an acceleration of the process by which inmates are selected for execution. 
Taken together, our results indicate that election year political considerations influence 
both the timing and racial composition of executions, a finding which seems in conflict with the 
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Supreme Court’s requirement that states administer the death penalty in a consistent and 
nondiscriminatory manner. Although not a legal analysis, this work does point to the need for 
further research on how death sentences are carried out by state governments. 
 18
Endnotes 
 
* Kubik: Center for Policy Research; Syracuse University; 426 Eggers Hall; Syracuse, NY 
13244-1020. Email: jdkubik@maxwell.syr.edu. Moran: Center for Policy Research; 
Syracuse University; 426 Eggers Hall; Syracuse, NY 13244-1020. Email: 
jmoran@maxwell.syr.edu. We thank Dan Black, Mike Conlin, Steven Levitt, Sam 
Peltzman, Charles Petrof, Johnny Yinger, and seminar participants at the University of 
Chicago for helpful suggestions. We also thank Shuo Zhang for assistance in the 
collection of the data. 
1. For conflicting evidence on the existence of racial disparities in the administration of the 
Federal death penalty, see U.S. Department of Justice (2000) and U.S. Department of 
Justice (2001). 
2. State and local elections have previously been shown to exert an independent influence 
on other public policy decisions. Examples include the level of spending and taxation 
within a state (Poterba 1994), police hiring by cities (Levitt 1997), and changes in state 
excise taxes on cigarettes and beer (Kubik and Moran 2001). 
3. Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to determine the extent to which the additional 
executions performed in election years represent a net increase in the number of 
executions conducted, or whether they are brought about purely through a reallocation of 
executions that would have taken place anyway. We discuss this issue in more depth in 
Section 5. 
4. Pridemore’s result is consistent with states increasing executions and decreasing 
commutations in election years. But it is also consistent with states increasing only 
executions, or holding the number of executions constant and decreasing commutations. 
Alternatively, states might decrease both executions and commutations during election 
years, but decrease commutations by more than executions. Or, states might increase both 
executions and commutations, but increase executions more. 
5. These restrictions result in a data set with 842 state/year cells. 
6. There are 199 state/year cells with at least one execution between 1977 and 1999. 
7. They are: New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA), East 
North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, 
SD), South Atlantic (DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), East South Central (AL, KY, 
MS, TN), West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX), Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NE, NM, 
UT, WY) and Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA). 
8. We have also estimated all of our probit models using logit and linear probability models 
and obtain similar estimates of the marginal effects using these other models. 
9. Including a fixed effect for each governor is akin to allowing for different period effects 
by state, where the periods are defined by the years that each governor held office. We 
also include year dummies to capture trends arising at the national level. 
10. In contrast to many of the studies on racial disparities in sentencing (see, for example, 
Gross and Mauro 1984; Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski 1990; and Glaeser and 
Sacerdote 2000), we did not find evidence of disparate treatment based on the race of the 
victim. One possible reason for this is the potentially different motivations that arise at 
the sentencing and punishment stages. At the time of sentencing, there is a substantial 
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focus on the victims of the crime; however, by the time an inmate is scheduled to be 
executed, news accounts typically focus on the race of the inmate rather than the victim. 
11. The South is defined as states in the three Census divisions that make up the South census 
region. They are the South Atlantic, the East South Central, and the West South Central 
divisions. 
12. Similar results are obtained if the effect of elections is allowed to vary across the four 
Census regions. 
 
13. The direct effect of a state being located in the South is subsumed in the state effects. 
14. We have also estimated this model using a specification that allows for a different effect 
of elections if the governor is a Republican, Democrat or independent. Again, we find 
little difference in the effect of elections across these states. 
15. Data on gubernatorial term limits come from various editions of the Almanac of 
American Politics (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews). 
 
16. We have also attempted to examine whether the election effect varies based on the 
closeness of the gubernatorial election. Using data on election outcomes from the 
Almanac of American Politics (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews), we found a small but 
statistically insignificant increase in the probability of an execution in years with a close 
election. A problem with this methodology, of course, is that whether an election is close 
or not might depend on whether there are executions in the state that year. Polling data on 
the popularity of the incumbent governor (sufficiently far in advance of the election to 
permit a reaction by the governor) would be a better measure, but consistent polling 
information across states and over time is not readily available. 
17. The count models in Table 9, as well as the probit models in Tables 4 and 5, were also 
estimated using data for the pre-Furman era from the publication, Executions in the 
United States, 1608-1991: The ESPY File (Espy and Smykla 1994). For the period 1935 
to 1968, we failed to find any large or significant effect of elections on either the 
probability of conducting an execution (either in general, or broken down by race), or on 
the number of executions performed. This result is perhaps not surprising in light of the 
fact that executions were very common during this period, implying that the marginal 
political benefit from holding an additional execution was probably negligible. 
18. A death sentence can be overturned because a court has declared the death penalty 
unconstitutional, because the conviction of a defendant was confirmed by a court but the 
death sentence was reversed, because both the conviction and sentence were overturned, 
or because there was a commutation of the death sentence. 
19. Because the election indicator only varies at the state level, we adjust the standard errors 
to take into account the within-state correlation of the observations. 
20. We find similar null results when using a count model to estimate the effect of 
gubernatorial elections on the number of commutations. 
21. This suggests that the election cycle in commutations per execution found by Pridemore 
is due to changes in executions rather than commutations. Another possibility is that the 
election cycles we observe are based on judicial, rather than gubernatorial, elections. To 
investigate this possibility, we gathered data on the timing of elections to each state’s 
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Supreme Court from www.faircourts.org for the death penalty states in our sample. An 
examination of these data reveal little overlap in when state Supreme Court justices are 
elected, making it difficult to distinguish between “election” and “non-election” years. 
The majority of death penalty states have between five and nine Supreme Court justices, 
with seven being the modal number. It is rare for half or more of a state’s Supreme Court 
justices to be up for election in the same year. Typically, only one or two justices are 
running for election in a given year. Moreover, seven of the death penalty states do not 
select Supreme Court justices through popular elections. Based on these observations, we 
believe it is unlikely that a judicial election cycle is the source of our findings. 
22. We have shown that the cycle is not attributable to a greater reluctance to issue 
commutations in election years. Another possibility, but one which we cannot investigate 
with our data, is that governors, or clemency boards, simply “stay” fewer executions in 
election years than in other years. These stays, which are temporary in nature, would lead 
to both an election cycle in executions and shorter death row spells for inmates executed 
in election years (who, under this theory, would be less likely to receive a stay). This 
theory offers a somewhat attractive explanation for the cycle because it does not require 
collusion between governors (or their representatives) and members of either the judicial 
or criminal justice systems. Nonetheless, it would still have important implications for the 
due process rights of prisoners, since those not receiving stays would be executed more 
quickly and would also have less time to gather potentially exculpatory evidence. It 
would also suggest, based on our earlier findings, that the likelihood of receiving a stay is 
a function of the defendant’s race, at least in election years. 
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Table 1. Number of Executions by State: 1977-2000 
 
 
State 
Year Death  
Penalty Reinstated 
Number of 
Executions 
  
State 
Year Death  
Penalty Reinstated 
Number of 
Executions 
AL 1976 23  MT 1974 2 
AK No Death Penalty   NC 1977 16 
AZ 1973 22  ND No Death Penalty  
AR 1973 23  NE 1973 3 
CA 1978 8  NV 1973 8 
CO 1975 1  NH 1991 0 
CT 1973 0  NJ 1982 0 
DE 1974 11  NM 1979 0 
FL 1972 50  NY 1995 0 
GA 1973 23  OH 1974 1 
HI No Death Penalty   OK 1973 30 
ID 1973 1  OR 1978 2 
IL 1974 12  PA 1974 3 
IN 1973 7  RI No Death Penalty  
IA No Death Penalty   SC 1974 25 
KS 1994 0  SD 1979 0 
KY 1975 2  TN 1974 1 
LA 1973 26  TX 1974 239 
ME No Death Penalty   UT 1973 6 
MD 1975 3  VT No Death Penalty  
MA No Death Penalty   VA 1975 81 
MI No Death Penalty   WA 1975 3 
MN No Death Penalty   WV No Death Penalty  
MS 1974 4  WI No Death Penalty  
MO 1975 46  WY 1977 1 
Notes: The number of executions is cumulative executions in a state, either after 1976 or after the state adopted the death 
penalty. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Yearly Executions by State: 1977-2000 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indicator that State Had Execution in Year 0.2530   
Number of Executions in Year 0.8111 
[2.937] 
0 40 
    
Indictor that State Executed White Defendant 0.1876   
Number of White Executions 0.4489 
[1.583] 
0 21 
    
Indicator that State Executed African-American Defendant 0.1390   
Number of African-American Executions  0.2898 
[1.113] 
0 16 
    
Average Months on Death Row of Defendants Executed in Year 119.6 
[51.77] 
3 242 
Notes: The sample includes states that have a death penalty between 1977 and 2000. Standard deviations are in 
brackets. There are 842 state/year observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3. Tablulation of Number of Executions in a State in a Year: 1977-2000 
 
Number of Executions Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
0 629 74.7 74.7 
1 111 13.2 87.9 
2 35 4.2 92.0 
3 16 1.9 94.0 
4 15 1.8 95.8 
5 8 1.0 96.7 
6 8 1.0 97.6 
7 2 0.2 97.2 
8 4 0.5 98.3 
9 2 0.2 98.6 
10 1 0.1 98.7 
11 1 0.1 98.8 
12 1 0.1 98.9 
13 1 0.1 99.0 
14 2 0.2 99.1 
17 1 0.1 99.3 
19 1 0.1 99.4 
20 1 0.1 99.5 
35 1 0.1 99.6 
37 1 0.1 99.8 
40 1 0.1 100.0 
Notes: This is a tablulation of the number of executions in each of the 842 state/year observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections  
on Whether a State Has an Execution during the Year 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indicator for Gubernatorial Election 0.4507 
(0.1868) 
[0.0588] 
0.6701 
(0.2462) 
[0.0670] 
0.5718 
(0.2063) 
[0.0681] 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether a state has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average 
marginal effects are in brackets. There are 842 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on  
Whether a State Has an Execution during the Year by Race 
 
 Whites  African-Americans 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Indicator for Gubernatorial Election 0.1002 
(0.1804) 
[0.0132] 
0.2334 
(0.2185) 
[0.0253] 
0.1257 
(0.2022) 
[0.0158] 
 0.6502 
(0.2606) 
[0.0442] 
0.8526 
(0.2828) 
[0.0512] 
0.6740 
(0.2887) 
[0.0403] 
        
State Effects Yes Yes ---  Yes Yes --- 
        
Year Effects Yes --- Yes  Yes --- Yes 
        
State Linear Trends Yes No No  Yes No No 
        
Year×Division Effects No Yes No  No Yes No 
        
Governor Effects No No Yes  No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a state has an execution during the year. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal effects are in brackets. There are 842 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections 
on Whether a State Has an Execution by Region 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election× Indicator for Northeast -0.0095 
(0.0354) 
0.0000 
(.0249) 
-0.0262 
(0.0399) 
    
Election× Indicator for North Central 0.0633 
(0.0602) 
0.0641 
(0.0834) 
0.0762 
(0.0639) 
    
Election× Indicator for South 0.1201 
(0.0490) 
0.1321 
(0.0564) 
0.1472 
(0.0486) 
    
Election× Indicator for West -0.0057 
(0.0522) 
-0.0434 
(0.0726) 
-0.0117 
(0.0527) 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether a state has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. There are 842 
observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections  
on Whether a State Has an Execution by the Governor’s Party Affiliation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election Indicator 0.0670 
(0.0419) 
0.0630 
(0.0464) 
0.0806 
(0.0418) 
    
Indicator for Republican Governor -0.0340 
(0.0331) 
-0.0373 
(0.0389) 
--- 
    
Election× Indicator for Republican -0.0076 
(0.0544) 
0.0022 
(0.0703) 
-0.0076 
(0.0562) 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether a state has an execution during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. There are 842 
observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 8. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections 
on Whether a State Has an Execution by Whether a State has Term Limit 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election Indicator 1.087 
(.4319) 
[.1231] 
1.081 
(.5282) 
[.0916] 
1.438 
(.4280) 
[.1436] 
    
Indicator for Term Limit -.0665 
(.6687) 
[-.0074] 
.5452 
(.4983) 
[.0447] 
.2181 
(.4854) 
[.0223] 
    
Election× Indicator for Term Limit -.7889 
(.4562) 
[-.0775] 
-.4925 
(.5837) 
[-.0386] 
-1.048 
(.4554) 
[-.0917] 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a state 
has an execution during the year.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Average marginal effects are in 
brackets.  There are 842 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9. The Effect of Gubernatorial  
Elections on the Number of Executions in a State 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indicator for Gubernatorial Election 0.1960 
(0.1292) 
[0.1681] 
0.2868 
(0.1737) 
[0.2535] 
0.2569 
(0.1279) 
[0.2237] 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from negative binomial models where the dependent variable is the number of 
executions in a state during the year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal effects are 
in brackets. There are 842 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10. Sample Probabilities That  
Inmates Leave Death Row in a Year 
 
 Yearly Sample Probability 
Inmate executed 0.0126 
  
Inmate dies because of other reason 0.0042 
  
Inmate’s death sentence is overturned 0.0362 
Notes: Tabulations of outcomes of all inmates on death row between 1977 and 1999. 
42,239 inmate/year cells. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 11. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on the Transitions of Death Row Inmates 
 
 Execution Transition  Death Sentence Overturned Transition 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Indicator for Gubernatorial Election 0.2818 
(0.1745) 
[0.0038] 
0.4016 
(0.1345) 
[0.0054] 
0.2172 
(0.4243) 
[0.0029] 
 -0.0753 
(0.1153) 
[-0.0026] 
0.0864 
(0.4599) 
[0.0027] 
-0.0212 
(0.1591) 
[-0.0008] 
        
State Effects Yes Yes ---  Yes Yes --- 
        
Year Effects Yes --- Yes  Yes --- Yes 
        
State Linear Trends Yes No No  Yes No No 
        
Year×Division Effects No Yes No  No Yes No 
        
Governor Effects No No Yes  No No Yes 
Notes: The estimates are from a multinomial logit model. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are adjusted to take into account the correlation 
of observations within states. Specification also includes dummies for race, marital status, sex and time on death row. Average marginal effects are in 
brackets. There are 42,239 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 12. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on  
Whether a State Commutes a Death Sentence during the Year 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indicator for Gubernatorial Election .2728 
(.2660) 
[.0200] 
.0674 
(.3219) 
[.0035] 
-.0608 
(.3648) 
[-.0032] 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a state 
commutes a death sentence during the year.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Average marginal 
effects are in brackets.  There are 842 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 13. The Effect of Gubernatorial Elections on  
the Amount of Time a Person Executed Is on Death Row 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indicator for Gubernatorial Election -.1777 
(.0902) 
-.0885 
(.1407) 
-.1288 
(.0806) 
    
State Effects Yes Yes --- 
    
Year Effects Yes --- Yes 
    
State Linear Trends Yes No No 
    
Year×Division Effects No Yes No 
    
Governor Effects No No Yes 
Notes: The coefficients are from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
average time the people executed in a state during the year spent on death row.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  There are 199 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calulations. 
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Figure 1. Number of Executions per Year:  1977-2000
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                   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. Number of States with Death Penalty: 
1977-2000
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     Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3. The Percentage of States with Death 
Penalty That Have an Execution in Year: 1977-
2000
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